138|환경법과 정책 제6권(2011. 5. 31) At a fundamental level, environmental property rights allow courts to acknowledge connections and dimensions of value that are otherwise less visible to the legal system. When environmental property rights empower individuals or legislatures to prevent environmental degradation, they bring into concrete legal form the inchoate connections that exist between all of us and the environment. When other environmental property rights convert an environmental improvement in one location into a marketable asset, they may help courts "see" that part of the value of property is its ability to produce environmental services (which are indirectly compensated when the environmental property right is sold). A cap on pollution helps courts see that pollution is a collective problem involving the management of an important resource, not simply a restraint on individual polluters who are misbehaving.
In this way, intangible environmental values are translated into property interests, making it easier for judges to recognize their reality. This recognition, in turn, can change the outcome of some constitutional issues.
Thus, environmental property rights can change the framing of constitutional cases and thereby impact outcomes. 3) In the first part of this talk, I will survey environmental property rights in the United States. Next, I consider whether it is really appropriate to call these "property" interests. Finally, the U.S. Constitution prohibits takstitutional laws that define property interests. For instance, in procedural due process cases, state law typically determines the existence and contours of the person's entitlement. Only then does federal law determine whether that entitlement qualifies as a property interest sufficient to trigger due process, and if so whether due process has been provided. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) . 3) Cf. Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: How Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2010) (arguing that reframing decisions can improve outcomes in a variety of contexts).
ing of private property without just compensation; I will discuss how environmental property rights could affect determinations of whether land or water rights have been taken unconstitutionally.
To determine whether property has been taken without just compensation, we must know:
(1) what property interests the owner originally had and (2) what the owner is left with. Environmental property rights that are held by third parties can subtract from the the owner's original property rights. Environmental property rights that are granted to the property owner can actually add to the set of property rights enjoyed by the owner. This second category of environmental rights, which augment the value of a property, undercut any claim that property has been taken without compensation. The remainder of this paper describes environmental property rights and then explains these constitutional arguments.
Ⅰ. Types of Environmental Property Rights
An environmental property right can be defined as an enforceable interest deriving from an environmental asset such as air quality or an undisturbed forest. Environmental property rights are diverse and varied. Some environmental property rights are marketable; others are not. Some environmental property rights involve the power to prevent a third-party from impairing the environment. Others are created when an owner gives up the right to exploit an environmental asset; the owner can then transfer that right to the owner of some other property.
American law recognizes a surprising number of environmental property rights. A listing includes at least ten types of environmental property rights:
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1. The Public Trust. Perhaps the environmental property right with the deepest historical roots in U.S./English law is the public trust doctrine, which limits the rights of public and private owners of certain lands.
Historically, the doctrine developed to ensure public access to waterways.
The public trust doctrine empowers members of the public to sue to prevent interference with their right to access, use, or enjoy water bodies.
In some states, this right has been extended to parklands. 4) For instance, if a property owner owns a beach and wants to expand his land further into the water, the public trust doctrine allows a citizen to sue to stop this action. tiated and purchased as sea levels rise. Instead, owners of property near the sea shore will receive a small payment today in exchange for the rolling easements.
4. Solar rights. Rights of access to sunshine are increasingly important due to the growth of solar power. These rights can take the form of express easements (often specifically authorized by state legislation), which in at least one state can be imposed on hold-outs by local regulators; 16) contracts between neighboring landowners, which also bind subsequent purchasers of the land; 17) or other legal tools. 18) 5. Tradable Permits. These are allowances which give the holder the right to emit a certain amount of pollution. Tradable permits exist only in the context of a legislatively created cap-and-trade scheme, which creates a market for the tradable permits. The permits have value because emissions are subject to an overall cap. Permits allow a firm that reduces its emissions to profit by selling the portion of its allowance that it does not use. 19) These allowances can be sold to other present or prospective dischargers, or to non-dischargers entering the market for speculative or environmentalist purposes. Most trading systems limit the duration of permits to some specified time, such as five or ten years. The initial permit holders can be chosen in several ways. Permits can be allocated among existing polluters (free or for a price), or among broader groups of applicants by auction or lottery. Once the pollution permits have been allocated initially, they are transferable, and sale prices function as free-market equivalents of pollution taxes. In modern American pollution statutes, the public can resort to a citizen suit if a private firm invades the quantity of resources reserved to the public, much as if the "over the cap" resource was subject to the public trust. In the U.S. tradable permits have been used successfully to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, and they are a leading part of proposals for reducing carbon dioxide emissions.
6. Carbon offsets. Greenhouse gas offsets, also commonly called carbon offsets, allow an emitter to meet the requirements of a cap-and-trade scheme by purchasing a carbon reduction from a third-party who is outside the trading system. These offsets could take the form of reduced emissions from sources that are not included in the cap-and-trade scheme within the United States. They could also be reductions from countries outside the domestic cap-and-trade, such as the substitution of a natural gas electricity generator for a coal-fired generator in China. Alternatively, they could involve the creation of additional carbon sinks, such as planting trees, using agricultural techniques that enhance sequestration, or possibly artificial carbon capture. 20) 7. Wetland mitigation credits. The inverse of pollution credits, mitigation credits create a "bank" of environmental resources. The bank pays the owner of land for restoring wetlands, and then holds the wetlands. When a developer wants to fill wetlands somewhere else, the developer has to pay the bank to for a corresponding amount of wetlands. In essence, mitigation credits require that a property owner that wants to destroy an environmental resource on their property will have to pay for the protection of that resource on someone else's property.
The policy of the U.S. federal governments is to avoid any "net loss" of wetlands. Through legislation and regulation, the government requires that if a wetland is lost in one place then additional wetlands must be L. 577, 579-580 (2009). Use of banking is preferred because it "encourages development of wetland mitigation banks in order to produce larger wetlands systems that will perform more functions more reliably, and because a mitigation bank can sell shares to developers before they destroy other wetlands, thereby reducing the time lag between destruction of a wetland and its replacement." Id. at 583-584. 
Ⅱ. Are ʻʻEnvironmental Property Rightsʼʼ Actually a Form of Property?
Some people may wonder whether it is accurate to attach the "property" label to these various mechanisms for environmental protection.
An environmental property right provides enforceable legal rights to control the use of some tangible resource, which seems to satisfy the ordinary meaning of the term "property." Conservation easements, rolling easements, and conservation trusts are merely a twist on a well-established legal property interests, at least in U.S. law, and the public trust doctrine is a property rule that precedes the American Constitution. Classifying 
Ⅲ. Environmental Property Rights and the Takings Issue
Under the U.S. Constitution, the government cannot take private property for public use without just compensation, similar to the Korean Constitution's requirement that just compensation be paid for "expropriation, use or restriction of private property." A taking may exist when the government has actually seized the land for its own, but it may also exist if the government has imposed harsh regulations on the land owner. The U.S.
Supreme Court has not found it easy to determine when a regulation of land use becomes a taking.
The Id. TDRs] are to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation." 40) Thus, the grant of TDRs weighs against finding that a development restriction "takes" private property.
The significance of Penn Central's treatment of TDRs has not been lost on property rights advocates. Justice Scalia has called for overruling this aspect of Penn Central or limiting it to its facts (involving the owner of contiguous parcels). In his view, TDRs are "a clever, albeit transparent, device" that could "render much of our regulatory takings jurisprudence a nullity." 41) Justice Scalia's critique of Penn Central seems misguided.
TDRs cannot be considered merely a form of takings compensation, because their issuance does not depend on a prior finding that a taking has occurred. Indeed, landowners may receive TDRs even when it is clear that no takings liability exists. In any event, the Scalia critique does not seem to have been successful. As a disgruntled commentator conceded, most courts today have "considered TDRs as an economic use existing with the land, thus mitigating the effects of regulation." 42) It is easy to imagine how other environmental property rights can be flexibly structured to prevent regulations from constituting a taking of private land. For instance, a grant of wetland mitigation credits could be considered to ameliorate the loss of development rights for a wetland.
Similarly, if the owner of forest lands is forbidden to harvest trees, any resulting carbon offsets (assuming they are available) would have economic value that weaken any taking claim.
Environmental property rights may also affect takings claims by defin-40) Id If a land owner's interests are subject to an environmental property right held by the government or by a third-party, the owner's reasonable expectations are limited accordingly. Nothing has been taken away from the owner, because he never had it in the first place. When a government action transmutes certain property rights into environmental property rights that can be exercised elsewhere or sold, it would be wrong to view the government's action as a simple deprivation of property rights, while ignoring that the owner's interests may have survived in a different guise.
Thus, when environmental property rights enter into the process, either before or as part of the challenged regulatory action, they mute the deprivation suffered by the owners, attenuating the claim of constitutional harm.
Ⅳ. Conclusion
We have seen that American law recognizes many kinds of environmental property rights. Unlike traditional property rights, these are not the right to share in profits or to use land for private purposes. Instead, they are rights to limit destruction of the environment or rights to profit from limitations on environmental harm. Although they may not be as familiar as traditional rights, many of these unconventional rights are economically valuable as well as useful in preserving the environment.
These new property rights change the boundaries of traditional boundary rights. For this reason, they can affect the determination of whether traditional property rights have been regulated to the point where compensation is required. Most legal systems recognize a difference between public law and private law. Environmental property rights cross that boundary. They are designed to further public purposes, and they may be created by environmental statutes. But they are also part of property law, a core part of private law. Thus, they require the attention of public law and private law experts.
These forms of property rights illustrate the need for creative thinking in environmental law. We cannot be content with traditional categories and ways of thinking. Instead, to meet the challenges of protecting the environment in the Twenty-First Century, we must be willing to use new ideas and to ignore traditional distinctions between areas of law. Hopefully, the 
